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This paper focuses specifically upon the question of control of the state-owned economic 
institutions, parastatals, after 1948 and during the 1950s. This question is raised in the 
context of the National Party's (NP) election victory in 1948, the relative economic weakness 
of Afi-ikaners compared to English speakers2 and the growing influence of the Broederbond. 
It is therefore concerned with the process by which Afrikaner nationalists came to dominate 
and control these institutions. There were two dimensions to this. The first was the 
pursuit, albeit a relatively pragmatic one, of the nationalist cause, and the second was the 
development of a network of clientelist relations through the allocation of "jobs to pals". 
This question has not been the subject of any previous detailed analysis by historians or 
political scientists. The little existing work on parastatals by Christie and Clark has not l 
focused on the process of the Nationalists' takeover.3 The traditional assumption amongst 
writers, especially prior to the work of Lazar and Posel on the 1950s,4 was that process of 
transition whereby the Afrikaner nationalists colonized state institutions should be 
conceptualized in terms of an immediate seizure of power following the 1948 election. The 
senior personnel of the state were regarded as  having been purged of their "English" 
elements and state policies immediately altered in ways which favoured Afrikaner interests 
over other white interests.5 The South African state in the 1950s had therefore been 
characterized by radical change following the 1948 NP election victory rather than by 
continuity. 
This paper challenges such a view in the case of the state-owned economic institutions. It 
argues that the reality was somewhat more complex. While the 1948 election victory did 
lead to immediate, politically-inspired changes at  the South African Railway and Harbour 
Administration (SAR&H), changes were more limited elsewhere. The result was that in the 
case of the main industrial parastatals, the Electricity Supply Corporation (Escom), the 
South African Iron and Steel Corporation (Iscor) and the Industrial Development 
Corporation (IDC), Nationalist domination was far from complete by the end of the 1950s. 
This situation prompted an informal investigation6 which concluded that the organizations 
remained "English" in character and called for drastic changes to be introduced. In the 
years following this, the restructured NP government with much closer ties to the 
Broederbond, in conditions of economic and political crisis, renewed the Afrikaner 
nationalist strategy to take full control of these institutions. This came to be implemented 
in the 1960s. 
Therefore the purpose of the paper is not to argue that the NP's victory of 1948 had no effect 
on the parastatals but rather to show that it had a less dramatic effect than has tended to 
be assumed and that it was only in 1960-1 that the Afr-ikaner nationalist strategy to take 
full control of these institutions was pursued more systematically so that a full 
Afrikanerization took place during the 1960s. These case-studies also show the need to 
disaggregate the South African state when analysing the transition process and not to treat 
it as a monolithic structure, so as to allow for a variety of experiences by its different 
elements. 
This paper accords closely with the recent work by Lazar and Posel on the 1950s which has 
emphasized the extent to which the Nationalists lacked a clear blue-print for action when 
they came into power in 1948.7 Posel has questioned the "Grand Plan" notion of apartheid 
by showing that important aspects of the policy had not been formulated when the NP won 
power and only crystallized during the course of the 1950s. Lazar has shown that the 
Broederbond did not assume dominance of the NP immediately after 1948 and it only did so 
towards the end of the 1950s. Furthermore, in both cases their work has pointed to the 
period between 1958 and 196 1 as the critical phase in these transitions. The periodization 
of the transition process for the established industrial parastatals analysed in this paper 
also identifies this as the crucial period in which Afrikaner nationalists assessed their lack 
of control and began to take steps to change the situation. 
Politicians and Bureaucrats 
The main department which supervised the activities of the industrial parastatals was the 
Department of Commerce and Industries.8 After the NP election victory the existing 
minister, S. F. Waterson, was replaced by E. H. Low who, as we shall see, began the process 
of reshaping the directorates of the parastatals. However his changes were limited, as were 
those of his successor, Dr van Rhijn. 
Furthermore, despite the change of ministers in 1948, the department did not see any 
immediate politically-inspired change in its most senior personnel. Instead there was 
considerable continuity amongst the civil servants in the Department of Commerce and 
Industries. Towards the end of the war in 1944 Frans du Toit had become the Secretary of 
the Department and De Waal Meyer the Under-secretary.9 In March 1949 du Toit became a 
special adviser to Louw, who appointed him as one of Iscor's directors.10 This was no 
sideways appointment. du Toit became Louw's special representative on the Iscor Board, 
entrusted with the task of ensuring that the Minister was kept fully informed,ll and shortly 
afterwards he was chosen as the f i s t  Chairman of Sasol and Foskor. It is striking that 
Louw was able and prepared to utilize an official who had been appointed to a senior 
position during the war. Following du Toit's departure his deputy de Wad Meyer was made 
Secretary and he remained in this position virtually until the end of the 1950s. It is this 
continuity which enabled the UK's High Commissioner to comment in 1958 that: 
... the damage to the nation's economy which wholesale economic favouritism could 
inflict has been avoided largely through the fearless advice, and where necessary 
opposition, of the very competent officials at the head of the Economic Departments of 
the Government. 12 
The High Commissioner was concerned that Verwoerd's restructured NP government would 
pursue the cause of Afrikaner economic nationalism more ruthlessly at  the expense of 
English interests. He feared correctly that' this, combined with the growing habit of making 
senior civil service appointments on the basis of political acceptability, would lead to 
changes in the senior economic positions within the state.13 Verwoerd had appointed 
Diederichs to the Economic Affairs Ministry. Diederichs held a senior position in the 
Broederbond and had close ties with the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut (AH11.14 He made 
changes in the department and, following an investigation, began a more concerted attempt 
to colonize the senior positions of the parastatals with Afrikaner nationalists and members 
of the Broederbond which was implemented in the 1960s. 
The emphasis on continuity amongst very senior personnel until the late 1950s was not 
mirrored in all other government departments. Most notably the Department of Defence 
and the Department of Railways witnessed politically-inspired change immediately after the 
NP came to power. In the South African Defence Force, only forty-three days after the NP's 
victory, the Defence Minister Erasmus moved General Poole, the Deputy Chief of the 
General Staff, to the head of the South African Military Mission in Berlin to stop his 
succession as  the Chief of the General Staff.15 In the Department of Railways the 
Nationalists forced the General Manager of the Railways, W. Marshall Clark, into early 
retirement although he still had at least thirteen years to serve in 1948. His deputy, W. H. 
Heckroodt, an early member of the Broederbond, was appointed as his successor. Marshall 
Clark meanwhile became a director and manager of Anglo American, a director of De Beers, 
of General Mining and Finance Corporation, and of Rand Mies.16 Clearly the Ws victory 
in 1948 did not have a uniform impact on government departments. Similarly amongst the 
different parastatals the process of Afrikaner takeover varied. 
The Parastatals 
Sasol, Fosker and the South African Railways 
These institutions do not seem to have posed the Nationalists with much problem in 
establishing their dominance and control. Unlike Escom, Iscor and the IDC they were not 
the subject of the Diederichs investigation. The reason why the Afrikaner colonization after 
1948 was unproblematic and relatively quick was, in the case of Sasol and Foskor, their 
circumstances of formation, and, in the case of SAR, its institutional position. While the 
origins of Sasol and Foskor lay in the pre- 1948 period neither Corporation had been formed 
as a public enterprise by 1948. The NP was therefore able to take over the idea and ensure it 
was implemented in a way which gave them the control they sought. Indeed when Sasol 
reported large losses, in the mid- 1950s, it became a matter of Nationalist prestige that the 
Corporation was turned into a profit making concern. By contrast it was because the SAR, 
since 1916, had been run as a government department with very little autonomy from 
politicians that colonization was carried through quickly. 
Sasol's origins extend back to the 1930s when there was a private attempt to launch a 
company to produce oil from coal. The Anglo Transvaal Investment Company, which had 
acquired the South African rights to the German Fischer Tropsch gasification process, 
established a company in 1936. The project failed and after the war the company 
approached the government for assistance in raising capital, which the Smuts government 
gave in 1947.18 However by 1950 the necessary capital still had not been raised. The NP 
government was keen to establish the industry but was nervous of being seen to be assisting 
a mining company and instead decided that a "national undertaking" should be created. 
The government therefore decided that rather than the IDC make a loan to Anglovaal it 
should buy the company's South African rights and create a corporation itself, which it did 
in 1951. The committee appointed in June 1950 to work out the details was strongly 
Afrikaner nationalist, consisting of F. J. du Toit, H. Van Eck, Dr M. S .  Louw, and P. E. 
Rousseau, though it did also contain two Anglovaal representatives, S. G. Menell, and A. F. 
Faickney. Rousseau later became Sasol's Managing Director, du Toit the Chairman and 
Van Eck, Louw and Faickney directors when Sasol was formed in 195 1.19 
Foskor was set up in 1951 with the IDC again providing the necessary capital. Foskor was 
developed to replace the imports of raw materials of phosphates needed to manufacture 
fertilizers. Phosphate deposits had been discovered at Phalaborwa by Anglo American which 
was interested in the property. However the NP government, as in the case of Sasol, decided 
that the corporation should be a "national undertaking" and therefore, like Sasol, a 
corporation was created through the IDC, and F. J. du Toit was made the Chairman.20 
While the SAR was a parastatal in the sense that it was a fully government-owned 
institution operating in the economy, it had been run since 1916 as  a government 
department. This institutional difference had two important consequences. Firstly, 
political intervention by the minister in managerial appointments and labour relations was 
simpler since the changes were being made in departmental staff rather than the personnel 
of a public corporation. Furthermore by 1948 this was a long-established practise. 
Secondly, the degree of parliamentary accountability and influence was much larger which 
meant that the pressure on the early NP governments to ensure that Afrikaners took 
control, and that Afrikaner grievances were dealt with swiftly, was much greater. 
Almost immediately after the NP came to power, while Marshal1 Clark was still the General 
Manager, the government appointed a commission of enquiry into SAR operations between 
September 1939 and June 1948. Its remit was to investigate the grievances of white 
employees with respect to their appointments, promotion, transfers and gradings where 
these had arisen because of discrimination on the grounds of political considerations or in 
connection with national war policy. Internal committees were also set up to look at  the 
behaviour of the Railway Police Force during the same period, and the extent of bilingualism 
in the railway service.22 
In 1946 approximately 75 per cent of the total white workforce employed on the Railways 
was Afrikaans-speaking while 75 per cent of the heads of department were English- 
speaking. During he first half of the 1950s the senior officers of the railway service 
underwent considerable change. By 1952 of the General Manager and Principal Officers 
who constituted the most senior officers in the service, only two men remained who had 
held a position of this rank before the NP came to power. These were D. H. C. du Plessis, 
who in 1955 was General Manager and had been the Chief Harbour Shipping and 
Development Manager, and D. M. Robbertze, Deputy General Manager in 1955, who had 
previously been Chief Commercial and Industrial Manager. These changes also involved a 
complete Afrikanerization of the positions. In 1949 four of the nine positions including the 
General Manager were held by English-speakers but by 1955 there were none. In the case of 
the General Managers department which consisted of 18 posts, approximately half were 
staffed by English-speakers in 1949 but by 1955 they were all staffed by Afrikaans-speakers 
of whom only four had been in similar posts in 1949.24 
The Industrial Development Corporation. 
The Industrial Development Corporation had been formed by the Smuts government in 
1940 with van der Bijl as Chairman and Van Eck as the Managing Director.25 It was 
launched as part of van der Bijl's strategy for the state to assist private industrialists to 
take advantage of the industrializing opportunities created by the war.26 From the 
beginning the Corporation was dominated by Van Eck,27 and in 1944 he became the 
Chairman, remaining in that position until his death in 1970.28 
The IDC's initial role was to assist the Union's industrial development by advising and 
financing prospective and existing private companies.29 In 1942, after a number of 
investigations, the enacting legislation was changed to allow the IDC to set up 
companies.30 The IDC's activities hereafter need to be divided into two kinds: firstly its 
activities under section 3(a) of the Act in which the Corporation set up and financed a 
concern. and secondly those under section 3(b) where the Corporation merely loaned money 
and helped existing private companies.31 The power under the 1942 amendment was later 
used by the Nationalists to create Sasol and Foskor.32 
The IDC was clearly the ideal institution for the NP to capture, concerned as it was to 
increase Afrikaner control of the economy and advance the interests of Afrikaner 
businessmen. Therefore it was not surprising that soon after the arrival of the Nationalists 
in government the NP began to change the complexion of the IDC's Board. In 1948 the 
IDC's board with the exception of Van Eck contained no Afrikaners. The Board consisted of 
Van Eck, A. B. McDonald (a businessman in the shipping industry), E. Langely Jackson (a 
former senior manager with Barclays Bank), J. D. F. Briggs (the former Labour Party 
politician), C. E. James (the chairman of a Durban commercial house), and G. H. Starck.33 
In 1949 the new Minister of Commerce and Industries, E. H. Louw, immediately made some 
changes to the Board introducing Dr M. S. Louw, a senior Afrikaner businessman in 
Sanlam and member of the AHI, J. M. van Tonder, a Cape businessman, and A. J. Bosman, 
a former civil servant in the Department of Commerce and Industries.34 These 
appointments had the effect of boosting the Afrikaner complexion of the Board significantly. 
Subsequently in 1954 and 1956 other Afrikaners were appointed to the Board.35 These 
changes were faster and larger than anything at Iscor or Escom. 
However, while the Afrikanerization of the IDC's Board was far reaching this failed to alter 
dramatically the operation of the Corporation and turn it into an organization which 
favoured the development of "Afrikaner" as opposed to "English" business.36 This was 
largely the result of the continuity of the IDC's senior managers, who were still 
overwhelmingly English-speaking by the end of the 1950s. The internal language of the 
Corporation, as the Diederichs investigation discovered to its horror, was still English. 
Only the Corporation's correspondence with the Department was in Afrikaans. Only two 
out of the six senior management positions were occupied by Afrikaans-speakers: that of 
the General Manager, by G. S. J. Kuschke, and an assistant manager, by S. F. Malan.37 
Below the senior management level, predictably, the position of the Afrikaner was better but 
far from dominant: of the total 76 personnel only 50 per cent were Afrikaans-speakers.38 
Dr Wassenaar has claimed that after 1948 the Malan government used the IDC "to 
strengthen [the] Afrikaners' participation in South Mica's industrial progressW.39 However 
the evidence for this is not very strong. Instead it appears that by 1958 in their ten years of 
being in power the NP government had done little to foster private-sector Afrikaner 
businessmen through the IDC. The Corporation had employed an Afrikaner accounting 
firm, Hoek, Wiehahn and Cross, in addition to its existing auditor Deloitte, Plender, 
Griffiths, Auman & CO, but was still banking with Barclays.40 More importantly, if the 
Corporation's activities under section 3(b) (under which it made loans to private companies) 
are examined there is little to suggest that the IDC was fostering Afrikaner concerns during 
the 1950s. By end of the 1958 financial year the IDC had an accumulated total investment 
under section 3(b) of £10,166,626, which represented an increase of 195 per cent on the 
1948 level, but only approximately £250,000 was invested in Afrikaner enterprises.41 This 
represented approximately 2.5 per cent of the total. In addition not all of the investments 
in Afrikaner enterprises were made after 1948.42 
Table 1 shows that in terms of the number of applications accepted by the IDC in the ten 
financial years after the Nationalists came to power only 1 1 per cent were from Afrikaner 
undertakings. This low percentage extended to the total applications to the IDC, where 
only 12 per cent of the total applications came from Afrikaner concerns. This data seems to 
reinforce Lazar's conclusion that during this period there was no dramatic growth in the 
number of urban Afrikaners who became entrepreneurs and industrialists; rather it was the 
existing large Afrikaner businesses such as Sanlam, Rembrandt, and Volkskas which 
developed.43 
This picture of the failure by the IDC to foster Afrikaner businesses during the 1950s 
requires one important qualification. During this period the bulk of the Corporation's 
activities took place under section 3(a) under which the IDC set up and controlled entire 
enterprises rather than simply making loans or owning some share capital. The 
Corporation's accumulated investment at the end of 1958 was approximately S60 million, of 
which, as pointed out above, PlOm was s.3(b) type investment, leaving £50 million as type 
s.3(a) investment.44 The Corporation's investments in two parastatals SasoI and Foskor 
amounted to approximately 90 per cent of this total, or £45 million.45 Given that these 
parastatals were dominated by Afrikaners it could be argued that the IDC did at least help to 
foster Afrikaner state capital. While this is an important qualification, however, it was not 
regarded as significant by the Diederichs investigation which concluded in 1959 that the 
IDC was an "English organization" which needed "purifyingW.46 The investigation led 
Diederichs to appoint Dr A. J. Visser47 and Dr F. J. de Villiers4EJ as directors. Changes were 
made to the IDC so that during the 1960s the IDC favoured Afrikaner applications and 
worked closely with large private Afrikaner companies,4Q though it should be remembered 
that the IDC never gave up doing business'with English or foreign companies.50 
The Electricity Supply Commission 
Escom took complete control over the electricity industry in 1948, prior to the Nationalists' 
victory, when Escom nationalized the Victoria Falls Power Company.51 Escom therefore 
represented an important parastatal for the NP to colonize in order to advance their 
economic power. However while some advances were made during the 1950% by 1959 
Afrikaner nationalists and in particular the Broederbond did not regard themselves as in 
control of Escom. Indeed, as Christie has shown, while in the early 1950s independent 
Afrikaner coal-owners prospered partly through state encouragement, it is important to 
recognize that Escom played a minor role in this. It was the SAR's truck allocation policy 
and the granting of export licenses by the officials in the Department of Commerce and 
Industry which were most significant.52 
The Diederichs investigation into Escom discovered that it was only after 1953 that 
Afrikaans had begun to replace English as the internal language of Escom. By 1959 at 
Escom House in Johannesburg, the Commission's Head Office, there was a rough equality 
between English- and Afrikaans-speakers, which was similar to the overall situation at 
Iscor's Head Office. However amongst the most senior positions at Escom English-speakers 
continued to dominate. Dr van der Bijl had been succeeded by J. R. Fulton as Chairman of 
Escom who in turn had been replaced by A. M. Jacobsin in 1955. Neither men were 
Afrikaner nationalists, rather both were long standing colleagues of van der Bijl who had 
been involved in Escom ii-om its early years. By 1959 an Afrikaner, Dr J. T. Hattingh, had 
become chairman but he was described by the investigation as being very "English- 
orientatedV.55 Out of the other four members of the commission two were English- 
speakers,56 and two were Afrikaans-speakers but only one was described as a Nationalist.57 
The position of Afrikaner nationalists in Escom's management was even weaker than on 
the Commission's board. The top management committee contained only one clear 
Nationalist, S. van Niekerk,ss the other five members were English-speakers, though two 
were considered to be slightly Nationalist in attitude.59 Amongst the senior staff in the 
Administrative Department only two out of the twelve positions were considered to be 
staffed by Nationalists.60 In the Department of Finance the ratio was one out of three,sl 
and in the Engineering Departments, both electrical and mechanical, three out of ten 
positions were staffed by Nationalists.62 Finally both the company secretary and the chief 
legal adviser were English-speaking non-nationalists.63 Overall only nine out of the thirty- 
three most senior management posts were staffed by Afrikaner nationalists, in other words 
less than 30 per cent of the senior management of Escom in 1959 were regarded by the 
government as their supporters. This position was radically changed in the 1960s. The 
new era was initiated by Diederichs's appointment of Dr R. L. Straszacher as Chairman of 
Escom in 1962. 
The South African Iron and Steel Corporation. 
Just as the electricity industry was dominated by Escom, Iscor-dominated the steel 
industry. In addition, Iscor was a large employer of white, almost entirely Afrikaner, 
labour.@ It was therefore an important target for Afrikaner colonization, and the NP's 
arrival in government signalled the beginning of a process of change in the composition of 
Iscor's Board. However, during the 1950s, the process was neither a swift nor a 
straightforward nationalist political colonization. Furthermore the pattern established prior 
to 1948 of using directorships as rewards for service to the government continued. This 
helped to ensure that Iscor was effectively run by its management, and here, as in the case 
of the IDC and Escom, colonization was even more tardy. 
During the period between 1949 and 1955 the members of the Iscor Board were changed 
completely by the NP government. However the appointees were not all Afrikaner 
nationalists and with one possible exception do not seem to have been members of the 
Broederb0nd.G Furthermore Louw had explicitly chosen to appoint some English-speaking 
members. Most importantly in 1950 he had appointed I. G. Fleming to the Board. Flerning 
was a successful English businessman.66 The NP government was clearly concerned to try 
to appease the English business community and Fleming's appointment was part of this 
attempt. The Board was not changed again prior to the Diederichs investigation. 
Before 1948 Iscor's senior management had been overwhelmingly dominated by English- 
speakers. While Afrikaners made some advance during the 1950s by the end of the decade 
they were still not in a dominant position. In 1954 and again in 1956 back-bench 
Nationalist MPS objected to the lack of progress made by Afi-ikaners.68 In 1954 Dr Care1 de 
Wet complained that, "... the Afrikaner still does not take up his rightful place in Iscor, and 
fair opportunities in every sphere are not at  present offered to hirnv.69 However, neither 
Louw nor his successor van Rhijn were prepared to intervene directly to change Iscor's 
management proflle. 
This is not to suggest that the NP victory in 1948 had no impact on Iscor's senior 
management but rather that it did not precipitate a quick politically-inspired 
transformation. Nationalist politics did make their presence felt regarding the job of General 
Manager. In 1950 Iscor's General Manager, A. M. Hagart, resigned because he felt he could 
not work within the context of a NP government.70 He joined his brother R. B. Hagart in 
the Anglo American Group becoming the Managing Director of African Explosives and 
Chemical Industries.71 This left a gap at the top of Iscor's management structure which was 
not formally filled until 1955 when an internal Afrikaner nationalist candidate with senior 
management experience, Dr Kruger, was appointed. His appointment was later celebrated by 
the Diederichs investigation as the one positive change in Iscor's senior management 
during the 1950s.72 
At the end of the 1950s the lack of progress made by the Afi-ikaner at  the Corporation since 
1948 was condemned by the investigation. Although Afrikaans-speakers had achieved 
approximate parity with English-speakers amongst the Corporation's 92 most senior 
positions this was not regarded as sufficient. What Afrikaner nationalists found 
particularly disturbing and unjust was the disparity between the English dominance of 
senior management and the Afrikaner dominance of the labour force.73 They were, of 
course, only interested in the white labour force which in fact only accounted for 
approximately half of the total.74 For the Afrikaner nationalists the history of Iscor was 
"tragically ironic". As  they saw it Iscor had been originally formed by the National Party but 
had been taken over by Dr H. J. van der Bijl, and "English orientated" directors and 
managers from Escom. During the growth of the Corporation from 1934 to 1948. the 
Afrikaner had been doomed to a menial role so that even at  Iscor they remained "drawers of 
water and hewers of wood". After 1948 Afrikaners had naturally anticipated that things 
would change but the investigation concluded that in just over ten years they had gained 
little.75 Afrikaans had not yet ousted English as the language of internal correspondence 
within Iscor, though the Minutes of the Board had become bilingual in 1953. The 
investigation expressed its greatest concern in relation to Iscor's management. The 
Administrative Department in particular was castigated because it was still non-nationalist 
in orientation. The investigation concluded that despite Dr Kruger's appointment the 
position of the Afrikaner at  Iscor was "... dangling by a thread ...", and if Dr Kruger were 
removed there would be no hope for Afrikaners.76 
Following the investigation Diederichs took some action. Iscor was required to submit 
detailed personnel charts which it did, ironically, in English. These showed that in 1960 
Afrikaners were far from dominant and still tended to be employed in lower-paid 
occupations compared to English-speaking whites. Table 2 gives a breakdown of the most 
senior positions. Of the top 94 posts in the Corporation, with salaries over 522,200, 
Afrikaners occupied only 49 per cent. This was better than the position within the total 
white population, but not dramatically so. The overall profile of Afrikaans-speaking 
employment at  Iscor, shown in Table 3, was heavily skewed towards the lower occupations. 
Furthermore, only one of the five most senior positions78 at  the apex of Iscor's management 
was occupied by an Afrikaans-speaker who was regarded as  a Nationalist.79 It was partly 
for this reason that Professor P. W. Hoek was appointed as commercial manager in 1961 .80 
Diederichs also acted, in 1960 and 196 1, to ensure Afrikaner nationalist control of Iscor's 
Board. He appointed Dr Kruger, J. van der Merwe and P. E. Rousseau, Rofessor H. J. 
Samuels and J. J. Vermooten a s  directors.81 Therefore it was not until the 1960s, as a t  
Escom and the IDC, that Afrikaner nationalists came to dominate Iscor's senior positions. 
Conclusion 
The paper has investigated the dynamics of the Afrikaner takeover during the 1950s. 
Through a disaggregation of the state it has shown that there was a variety of experience. 
In the cases of Sasol and Foskor nationalist control was ensured from the outset, and at  
the SAR the process of capture was implemented relatively quickly and effectively. However 
the paper has shown that this experience was not universal. During the 1950s not only 
did Afrikaners face a struggle in establishing themselves in the private sector manufacturing 
and mining industries but also within parts of the public sector. 
The paper has argued that the economically powerful institutions, Iscor, Escom and the 
IDC, were only slowly and incompletely captured by the NP government during the 1950s. 
This is not to argue that nationalist politics had no impact on the parastatals during the 
1950s but rather that there was not a simple seizure of these organizations by the NP to 
further the aims of Afrikaner nationalism. It was their failure to secure complete 
domination and dramatically advance the interests of Afrikaners which the Diederichs 
investigation found disturbing. The investigation and the subsequent efforts by Diederichs 
to improve the position need to be understood in terms of the wider problems which faced 
the government in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Verwoerd and close colleagues, 
including Diederichs, faced internal political problems within the National Party and a t  a 
wider political level the government faced its biggest challenge to date from black political 
resistance. To aggravate the situation, economic growth and private investment were 
falling and the outflow of foreign capital after Sharpeville added to the sense of economic 
crisis. In this context securing dominance of these economically powerful institutions by 
trusted Afrikaner nationalists was given an enhanced relevance. Consequently Diederichs 
appointed members of the Broederbond to the Boards of Directors and, in the case of Iscor, 
to its senior management. These helped to create the circumstances in which full 
Afrikanerization of the institutions personnel could take place during the 1960s. 
Finally it is interesting to consider what parallels this discussion of the transition of the 
South African state in the 1950s has with the 1990s. Despite all the differences between 
the situation of the NP in 1948 and the likely situation of a new black government if one 
comes to power, similarities exist in terms of the wish to reward colleagues and supporters 
combined with the sense of economic impotence and the desire to secure their rightful 
share. In a context where large scale nationalization looks increasingly unlikely, a black 
government might well pursue a strategy of colonizing the remaining parastatals such as 
Escom, the IDC and Transnet. However if the experience of the Afrikaner nationalists in 
the 1950s is anything to go by this could be a slow process. 
Table l 
Industrial Development Corporation 
Investment Proposals under s.3(b) 1949 - 1958. 
By Language 
Year Received 
Afrikaner 
1949 6 
1950 7 
1951 3 
1952 1 
1953 3 
1954 1 
1955 2 
1956 6 
1957 5 
1958 9 
Period 
Total 43 
% 12 
English 
56 
19 
13 
16 
20 
15 
29 
26 
37 
37 
268 
73 
Other 
11 
5 
6 
6 
3 
5 
4 
3 
6 
5 
54 
15 
Total 
73 
31 
22 
23 
26 
2 1 
35 
35 
48 
5 1 
365 
100 
Authorized 
Afrikaner 
2 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
2 
1 
5 
2 
14 
11 
English 
15 
2 
4 
3 
4 
3 
10 
7 
20 
22 
90 
72 
Other 
3 
1 
4 
1 
0 
2 
2 
2 
6 
1 
22 
17 
Total 
20 
4 
9 
4 
4 
5 
14 
10 
3 1 
25 
126 
100 
Source: Extracted from statistics in MES H41 12 volume 2, SASAP. The classification of the 
proposal was determined by the language of the applicants. 
Table 2 
Senior Positions at Iscor, 1960. 
Employees in all Divisions by Language. 
Language Top 94 Posts with All Posts with 
Salaries over £2,200 Salaries over £1,200 
No. % 
Afrikaans 49 52 
English 42 45 
Other 3 3 
Total 94 100 
No. % 
504 54 
384 41 
47 5 
935 100 
Sources: Calculated from personnel charts in MES H41 12/4 vol. l ,  SASAP. The top 94 
positions represented the managerial elite of Iscor which by 1960 employed 24,300 people. 
Afrikaans-speakers at Iscor, 1960. 
Number of Employees by Salary Level. 
Level 
Over 522,200 
£1,200-£2,200 
Under £1,200 
Daily Paid 
Total 
No. % 
49 1 
455 5 
1,931 22 
6,501 72 
8,936 100 
Sources: Op. cit. Table 3.1. The under £ 1.200 column only includes white-collar workers. 
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SCHOOL, STREET AND IDENTITY 
Soweto Youth Culture 1960-1976 
Clive Glaser 
The 1976 Soweto youth uprising has received a great deal of attention historically yet, 
somewhat surprisingly, very little has been written on Soweto youth culture in the 1960s 
and 70s. Historians have tended to ignore the complexity of the youth culture itself and, 
instead, to concentrate on the immediate political antecedents to the 1976 uprising.1 In 
fact, the 1960s have all but been discarded historically because of the apparent political 
acquiescence of the decade. The 1960s receive attention only where early origins of the 
uprising can be detected. This emphasis on an explosion of cathartic violence and 
resistance has obscured important, though perhaps less spectacular, historical processes 
such as the development of day-to-day coping strategies and the formation of youth 
identity. The chroniclers of the uprising have shown some token sensitivity to division 
within the Soweto youth constituency but they have underplayed, and certainly failed to 
explore, this diversity. Hirson, for instance, observes that only about a third of Soweto's 
population under the age of 20 was registered at school at the time and that "there was no 
reason to suppose that those rejected by the school system had any particular regard for 
those receiving an educationW.2 Brooks and Brickhill note that "the lumpen sub-stratum of 
the tsotsi ... played an ambivalent role in the uprising, at times exploiting situations to loot, 
rob and extort, at  other times joining in with the students in the battle against their 
common foe, the police."3 Yet neither study pursues the theme of youth diversity any 
further.4 I approach Soweto youth culture from two uncharted directions. First, I begin my 
study in the politically quiet 1960s and, second, I concentrate on the every-day experience 
of youth.5 Political activism, although growing in prominence fi-om around the end of the 
1960s, is seen as one option in an array of possible social strategies. 
The emergence of mass schooling under Bantu Education had a profound impact on youth 
culture in the 1960s. During the 1940s and most of the 1950s schoolgoing children were a 
small constituency in Soweto and the Western Areas. As  I have argued in my M.A. thesis, 
"Anti-Social Bandits", the gang and streetcorner subculture predominated amongst male 
teenagers and young adults. During the 1960s school became an increasingly common and 
significant feature of township experience. Until the early 1970s Bantu Education 
emphasized primary schooling in the urban areas at  the expense of secondary education. 
High school students remained a small constituency but, by the mid 1960s, almost all 
Sowetan children had gone through at  least some primary schooling. From around 1972 
Soweto's secondary schooling, freed from its 1960s stasis expanded dramatically. Outside 
of the home, then, school became an increasingly important counterforce to street culture. 
In other work I will focus more directly on the school and street culture themselves. This 
paper examines school and street as opposite poles in an array of possible youth identities. 
I will argue that there was substantial overlap between school and street. Male youths, 
both school-going and non-school-going, shared many common experiences through 
neighbourhood networks and streetcorner gangs. Nevertheless, identities, although 
strikingly fluid, suddenly solidifled around school, gang or neighbourhood at moments of 
threat and heightened competition. 
The Spec- 
From its inception, the Bantu Education Department placed enormous emphasis on the 
first fow years of schooling. This was "seen as providing a basis for semi-skilled labour 
requiring minimal numeracy, literacy and work discipline".s Although standards dropped, 
the system accommodated far more lower primary students than had the old missionary 
system. By 1960 about 1.5 million Africans enrolled in school nationally; the figure had 
risen to almost 2 million by 1965; 2.74 million by 1970 and about 3.7 million by 1975. A 
small proportion of students remained at school beyond Standard Two and fewer still 
beyond Standard Six. Lower primary school (Sub A through to Standard Two) accounted 
for around 70 per cent of the total enrolment throughout the 1960s, dropping to 64 per cent 
by 1975. The proportion in higher primary (standard three to standard six) gradually crept 
up from 22.7 per cent in 1960 to 27.4 per cent in 1975. Those who made it through to 
secondary school represented a tiny elite: 2.2 per cent in 1960; 4.48 per cent by 1970 and 
increasing substantially during the early 1970s to reach 8.61 per cent by 1975.7 
Although the vast majority left school prematurely, the Bantu Education Journal could 
boast that in 1963 over 80 per cent of "educable" African children between the ages of 7 and 
14 were accommodated in school.8 The 1960 median age in standard six was 16.63 for boys 
and 15.89 for girls. Given also that numerous lower primary school places were occupied by 
children over 14, it is reasonable to argue that a substantial proportion (if only a large 
minority) of 15 and 16 year-olds were also attending schoo1.Q As for Soweto itself, the 
official school population in 1964 was 84,000: "more than 90,000" in 1969; 110,000 in 1973 
and, according to Hirson, about 170,000 in 1976.10 The sudden increase in the last figure 
has to do with the Vorster government's go-ahead in 1972 to the Johannesburg City 
Council, boosted by the TEACH fund, to build new schools, including several secondary 
schools, in Soweto.11 A somewhat more uerligte faction of the National Party came to the 
I fore in 1972 which accepted the need for urban secondary school expansion.12 During the 
1960s the government virtually froze urban African secondary school construction. In line 
with its determination to develop the homelands, the establishment of new high schools 
was confined to the homelands, so that Soweto's secondary school population was only 
8,000 in 1966.13 By 1971 there were 8 high schools in the area.14 Relative to the national 
figures for African education, Soweto had a fairly high proportion of high school students 
but this had to do with the legacy of the 1940s and 1950s rather than Bantu Education 
policy. While the ratio of primary enrolment gradually improved throughout the country 
during the 1960s it declined in Soweto. Lower primary education was, however, widely 
available to the point that it became rather exceptional for a child to receive no schooling at 
all.15 The non-school youth were clustered heavily in the over- 16 age group. 
The emergence of mass schooling in Soweto did not precipitate a stark division between 
school and non-school youth. The average neighbourhood would include a spectrum of 
youths who fitted into one of the following categories: attending school, temporarily out of 
school, out of school but with several years of schooling, informally employed, formally or 
domestically employed, and hardcore school "drop outs" or "push-outs".l6 It was common 
in the 1960s and 1970s for youths to leave school for a year or two, often to seek short term 
employment, before returning to the classroom.l7 Urban African school-leavers 
encountered massive problems in finding employment. Despite the energetic efforts of the 
Johannesburg Juvenile Employment Section, local employers were slow to employ urban 
juveniles.18 Generally, they felt that "age, physical appearance and inexperience combined 
with irresponsibility, high labour turnover and absenteeism, limits the juvenile employment 
potentiaY.19 In addition, formal employment was limited to those who had legal urban 
status. Seeking employment often exposed questionable urban status.20 Youths who 
could not find formal jobs often made some money as vendors, shoe-shine boys or shop 
assistants.21 Crime was another option, though serious crime was largely confined to the 
hardcore push-out element, those who left school very early with no intention or possibility 
of returning. Some chose to leave school, some had to leave because parents could not 
afford the fees and uniforms, while others were permanently screened out after having failed 
twice in a row.22 Girls who were not at school very rarely found formal jobs but tended to 
be drawn far more thoroughly into domestic duties than boys. One of the most common 
reasons for girls leaving school was "taking a fall", in other words, early pregnancy. Once 
they became mothers they were not accepted back into school.23 Apart from domestic work 
and motherhood, girls and young women were often employed informally in beer-brewing. 
waitressing and prostitution. 
One experience shared by most school and non-school youth was corporal punishment. 
Beatings were the accepted method of disciplining children whether at  school or in the 
household. One informant who lived in Rockville as a teenager in the 1960s recalls that 
"an elder had every right to punish you without question."24 Corporal punishment was rife 
in Soweto schools during the 1960s and 70s. According to Khehla Shubane, who attended 
Molapo Secondary and then Morris Isaacson High during the 1970% corporal punishment 
was universal: "it was part of everyday life ... Schooling meant you had to be moered."s 
Parents generally supported and encouraged the practice; school was seen as an extension 
of their generational authority. As Linda Duma, who started his schooling in Soweto in the 
late 1960s, puts it: "The authority of the school has to be seen in the context of the 
dominant culture outside the school . . . in the sense of the school being viewed . . . as a place 
where kids had to learn about respect ... That is why discipline was seen as an important 
part of the school because even the parents gave the school that authority to reinforce 
respect."26 When children reported back home about beatings, parents generally assumed 
the punishment to have been legitimate and sometimes even beat their children again to 
reinforce the message.27 It has even been suggested by ex-students that corporal 
punishment contributed to the high truancy and drop-out rates.28 Shubane loathed the 
routine beatings; he remained at school only because his parents forced him to. The 
neighbourhood street networks, which included students and non-students, represented on 
one level a flight from the regimes of adult authority both at home and at school. The street 
was a realm in which young males could make their own rules. 
Despite the expansion of schooling, Soweto's streetcorner networks continued to proliferate 
throughout the 1960s and 70s. Young men who had grown up together congregated at 
corners to socialize and pass the time. The networks shaded from indistinctive play-groups 
to non- or petty-criminal gangs through to hardcore criminal gangs. "Every little corner of 
the township," recalls Murphy Morobe, "had its own gangsters."zQ At the core of these 
groups were non-school-going, unemployed males, aged roughly 14 to 20, who had an 
enormous amount of unsupervised free time on their hands. Neighbourhood networks, 
however, did not exclude students or formally employed youths. Although school itself was 
a world cut off from non-students, students did participate significantly in street life. 
Khotso Seathlolo, for instance, as a student in Naledi during the early 1970s. would "mill 
around with other neighbourhood kids, at streetcorners ... We were all boys from the same 
area ... I always spent most of my idling time with fellows who weren't going to school."3o 
Denis Nkosi recalls that in Meadowlands over the weekends it was difficult to recognize the 
difference between school-going and non-school-going youth."31 Even well-known 
identifiable gangs, some of which were involved in serious criminal activities, had a 
smattering of school-going members. Murphy Morobe, despite a strict Christian homelife, 
became "associated" with the Green Berets of Orlando East "because most of the youngsters 
were people I grew up with . . . playing soccer together, chasing girls together . . . It's like a 
family, an association of close friends." Morobe himself never carried a knife and avoided 
serious gang fights. He acquired the name "Professor" "because my close colleagues 
considered me too bookish". He spent too much time studying "when they had more 
exciting things to do outside school hoursW.32 Two members of the Biafras, including the 
"boss", Hector, apd at least one member of the notorious Damaras were apparently 
"regulars" at Madibane High School in Diepkloof during the early 1970s. Most of the 
Diepkloof gangs had members who went to school.33 Johannes Radebe, while still 
attending school a t  the age of 18, became the leader of the Top Eleven gang of Central 
Western Jabavu in 1965. "I attended school as usual and after school I would take off my 
school clothes and wear my gang clothes to take up the leadership where I left off when I 
was at school."34 Although most of the members later dropped out of school, The Dirty 
Dozen apparently emerged out of a group of friends at Pimville High School.35 Even some 
members of the most feared gang in Soweto in the early 1970s, the Hazels of Mzimhlophe, 
attended school at least initially.36 
The street networks or gangs would assemble around the nearest shops for companionship 
and entertainment. "That's where you'd have to go to touch base with people."37 They 
would gamble, "chase girls" and smoke dagga. Soccer was a particularly important point of 
connection; if there were a nearby soccer field, that too would become a central gathering 
point.38 These neighbourhood networks developed a strong sense of parochial identity. As 
Morobe comments: "One love of every youngster growing up in the township is to have 
your group of colleagues who[m] you meet at the shops or the streetcorner ... Over time it 
graduates into ... a bunch of youngsters who begin to look at  themselves in terms of the 
territory in which they play around."sQ 
Youths were also more or less forced into identifying with local neighbourhood gangs out of 
a need for protection. An  individual youth needed group support to survive on the streets. 
In order to avoid bullying, harassment and extortion from territorial local gangs he had to 
join a gang himself. In the Green Berets. Morobe observes, "Invariably, when one gets 
threatened ... it becomes the responsibility of all to come to the protection of that one 
member."m Non-aligned individuals were always vulnerable. Johannes Radebe, for 
instance, joined the Top Eleven "because I could see I was not going to survive if I did not 
join them."41 Gangs often emerged precisely to counter the force and terror of another 
powerful gang. Apart from provident companionship and entertainment, then, gangs 
functioned as local youth defence networks.42 
The majority of streetcorner gangs were not involved in serious crime or violence. They were 
generally nameless and individual members were known only very locally. Petty crime such 
as pickpocketing was common, but streetcorner gangs would rarely steal from people in their 
immediate neighbourhood. Gangs often fought amongst themselves, as I will show later, 
when territorial codes were breached or when they competed over women and facilities. But 
the average gangs fought with their fists or stones. When knives were used victims were 
"scratched" with surface wounds rather than seriously injured.43 The really serious youth 
crime and violence (mugging, abduction and gang rape, housebreaking, murder) was 
associated with distinct notorious gangs which were numerous, particularly in the early 
1970s. but nevertheless relatively marginal. 
These hardcore criminal youth gangs had large and stable memberships (usually between 20 
and 50), clearly defined territory, distinctive names and style. They were famous beyond 
their own neighbourhood. Their targets for criminal activity were trains, buses, stations 
and the Johannesburg Central Business District. Members were often slightly older than 
those of neighbourhood gangs, sometimes even reaching into their mid-twenties. It is 
difficult to draw a clear line between the neighbourhood gangs and hardcore criminal gangs; 
the categories tend to blur and shade into one another through time and space depending 
on levels of criminality, size, fame and coherence of style and membership. The hardcore 
gangs should be seen as the end of a continuum rather than a separate category. Morobe's 
neighbourhood gang, the Green Berets, started out as  an association of friends who 
supported and protected one another "and then it snowballed.. . into massive gang warfare". 
Similarly, large, feared gangs such as the Dirty Dozen of MorokaIPimville and the Japanese 
of Jabulani started out as small, defensive networks which gradually became more violent 
and assertive.44 Although I have emphasized the overlap between school and street, there 
was a fairly clear correlation between early school-leaving and violent, anti-social 
gangsterism. Most hardcore gangsters had dropped out of school by Standard Two or 
earlier.45 Without school absorbing their time and providing a counterbalancing set of 
influences and aspirations, and with little chance of finding employment until at least their 
later teens, these dropouts were, in the words of Fanyana Mazibuko, "sitting ducks for the 
gangsW.4s Gang life provided school pushouts with a sense of companionship and 
belonging. Money, and consequently crime, became increasingly neccessary for items such 
as cigarettes, dagga, liquor, stylish clothing, presents for girlfriends. The quest for these 
goods went beyond hedonism and consumerism; they were important for subcultural status 
and acceptance.48 It had an aura of freedom, independence and excitement which 
encouraged boys to drop out of school, particularly those who had a taste for gang life after 
hours. Gangs seemed attractive to many who laboured under the school regime of 
discipline, drudgery and corporal punishment. 
The hardcore gangs were intensely conscious of style and identity. There were certain city- 
slicker clothing styles to which all gangsters aspired during the 1960s and 70s. This clever 
style, which I discuss later, was not necessarily confined to gangsters. The tsotsi pants of 
the 1940s and 50s gradually gave way to gaberdines and Dobshires. Sportie caps and 
lumberjackets became popular by the late 1960s. Smart clothes were generally combined 
with sports shoes. Even if a gangster were very poor it was important for him to acquire 
certain basic style items. He also had to learn to walk in the "limping" clever style. Linda 
Duma recalls the style of two rival Diepkloof gangs in the 1970s, the Hyenas and the 
Biafras. "They dressed in specific ways . . . they had takkies called PFs. that was very 
common amongst the so-called clevers, the streetwise ... and gaberdine trousers were 
common, others wore the Lee's jeans ... and floral shirts with big blocks, things like that ... 
sportie caps . . . and they had a particular way of walking: limping, limping, limping . .. that's 
how we recognised them." What distinguished the Hyenas from the Biafras was not so 
much dress codes as "the area of operationW.49 Although gangsters were generically 
identifmble, the more famous gangs liked to dress in a distinctive colour or make of clothing. 
The Hazels were known for their expensive clothing tastes. According to "Bra Foca", an 
ex-member of the gang, they frequented a particular shop in town called the American 
Showroom. They chose exclusive labels. Most distinctively, they wore Barracuda 
lumberjackets and sportie hats.50 Hazels often wore army jackets which were unusual in 
that they were blue rather than khaki.51 According to Mary Modise, a Mzimhlophe resident, 
Hazel molls, or girlfi-iends, were identified by their red berets.52 Some gangs identified 
themselves in other ways. The Msomis of Orlando East, for instance, painted distinctive 
question mark tattoos on their foreheads53; the Apaches of White City Jabavu wore 
Nazi-style helmets and rode bicycles54; the Eleven Boys wore an easily recognizable earring 
in one ear .55 
Three broad young male subcultural styles could be identified in Soweto during the 1960s 
and 1970s: clevers, ivies and hippies. Gangsters were invariably clevers but non-gangsters 
often aspired to the same style. The term "clever" can be traced back into the 1930s. 
predating even "tsotsi", which emerged in the early 1940s. Cleuers were streetwise 
city-slickers. They asserted an urbanness which defined insiders according to dress, 
language and stylecodes. The antithesis of clever was "moegoe" or "country-bumkin". The 
tsotsi style was initially a sub-clever style in the 1940s but eventually became almost 
synonomous with clever by the 1950s. The term tsotsi gradually developed a far clearer 
criminal connotation through tirne.56 The gang style described above epitomized high clever 
style in the 1960s and 1970s. Non-criminal youths who aspired to "cleverness" would 
either have to acquire money through formal or informal employment or belong to wealthier 
families. Hippies and Ivies were clearly non-criminal and therefore tended to be employed or 
better-off youths. Ivies wore a different cut of clothes from the clevers. Whereas clevers 
wore their pants resting on their hips, the Ivies wore their pants above the belly-button. 
The Ivy style was clean-cut and dandyish, even prissy; it would emphasise, for instance, 
makes of aftershave and deodorant. Clevers, with their particular brand of urban 
machismo, generally regarded them as "good boys" and "sissies".57 Hippies became 
increasingly popular in the late 1960s. They wore bellbottoms, sandals and peace signs and 
linked up to white hippie culture. The fringes of non-criminal gang culture often 
participated in Ivy and hippie style. Clever, Ivy and hippie were loose style categories which 
cut across school and non-school township youth. 
Although many township girls participated indirectly in gangs as girlfriends, they were 
basically excluded from street culture. As  in the 1940s and 1950s, the exploration and 
assertion of masculinity was central to gang culture.58 Outside of school life female teenage 
culture was fragmented into the household. Parents tended to be more strict about the 
movement of girls and drew them more effectively into demestic duties.59 Wilkie Karnbule, 
the headmaster of Orlando High School during the 1960s and 1970s, suggests that boys 
became increasingly difficult to control as they matured physically around 15 or 16 years of 
age, particularly in the numerous female-headed households.~o Girls generally completed 
more years of schooling than boys. Although their numbers thinned in Form Four and Five, 
the 1960 census figures for Johannesburg suggest that fewer girls than boys dropped out 
during the higher primary and early high school stages. One table provides an age and 
gender breakdown for African educational levels. In the 15-24 age category, which records a 
total of 57,000 males and 54,000 females, over 17,000 males had no schooling at all, 
compared to only 7,000 females. Perhaps even more significantly, just over 19,000 males I 
compared to almost 28,000 females had a Standard Five, or higher, qualification.61 
Fanyana Mazibuko argues that this is partly explained by the powerful counter-attraction 
of gangs for boys. The church and Christian youth clubs represented alternative points of 
social contact for girls outside of the home and school. According to the 1960 census 
figures on African religious affiliation in Johannesburg, 16,500 males in the 15-24 age l I 
category had "no religion" or no religious affiliation, compared to only 4,500 women. The 
1970 census data do not supply a Johannesburg breakdown but nation-wide "urban" 
figures suggest at least continuity in the relative apathy of young males towards religion.62 
Wayfarers, Sunbeams and Girl Guides had a real presence in the township but, according to 
one ex-Girl Guide from Rockville, they organized primarily through the schools and 
therefore failed to draw in a non-school constituency.63 Like boys, girls frequented soccer 
matches, shebeens and cinemas but usually through linking into male networks rather 
than establishing their own. 
A further division in Soweto youth identity during the 1960s and 1970s was that between 
the so-called ndofaya and kalkoen. This division first emerged in the 1940s. The nsofaya 
were youths of SophiatownIWestern Areas origin. They had grown up speaking a tsotsitaal 
based on Afrikaans, probably because they came from mixed African/coloured residential 
areas. They called youths of Soweto origin kalkoene, taunting them that they spoke "like 
turkeys". The kalkoen tsotsitaal was Zulu-based and evolved into scamtho, the dominant 
street language in Soweto today. The term of derision was eventually adopted positively by 
the youths of Soweto origin themselves. The two groups had subtly discrete styles which 
each portrayed as the authentic urban youth fashion. Non European Affairs Department 
social worker, Seadom Tloteng recalls, for instance, that the ndofaya liked jazz music while 
the kalkoene liked mbaxanga. Competition was heightened following the Western Areas 
removals as  the ndofQya were resettled in the heart of kalkoen country, in parts of 
Rockville, Meadowlands, Mofolo and Diepkloof.64 Males were central in asserting ndofaya 
and kalkoen identities (which were to some extent sub-clever identities). Nevertheless, 
unlike cleverness, these categories included girls. 
Soweto youth culture, from as early as the 1940s, emphasized urbanness and underplayed 
ethnic diversity. (I exclude here the specifically migrant and largely insulated youth groups 
such as the Amalaita). This "melting pot" effect was reinforced by the existence of tsotsitaal, 
a hybrid language which, although regionally diverse, was intelligible throughout Soweto. 
However, during the implementation of ethnic zoning in the 1960s, ethnic identity became 
increasingly noticeable in urban youth culture. Through ethnic zoning, many 
neighbourhoods, and by extension local gangs, becamt ethnically uniform. Gang 
competition was highly localized ensuring that inter-ethnic conflict remained fairly rare. 
Nevertheless, there were certain zone border areas where gang and ethnic conflict began to 
overlap. On the border between Zola, which was a predominantly Zulu area, and Naledi, 
which was a Sotho area, youths on either side of the dividing road identified themselves 
ethnically during the 1960s.65 Similarly, Linda Maselo recalls that in the ethnic zones of 
Diepkloof gangs could be classified ethnically by the 1970s. The Biafras of Zone 6 were 
"Sotho" and the Mongols of Zone 3 were "ShangaanW.66 
Soweto youths had a very narrow range of role models during the 1960s and 1970s. They 
lived in a parochial world of limited horizons and aspirations. For boys, gangsterism was 
romantic and alluring. Famous gangs such as the Hazels and movie gangsters and bandits 
were idolized by younger boys.67 Al Capone and the Mafia were admired.68 These distant 
exotic figures were made more tangible through much admired "senior clevers" such as Peggy 
Be1 Air, an ex-member of the Americans of Sophiatown.69 Sports stars, particularly in 
soccer and boxing, were also powerful role models. Gangsterism and sports provided routes 
to fame and stardom outside of the drudgery of education. Many youths who stayed on 
into high school aspired to become Umapalani, the learned and literate. essentially teachers 
and clerks. Girls had the popular option of nursing.70 During the early 1970s a political 
role model became increasingly attractive within the school environment. Young university- 
educated teachers, such as Abram Tiro, disseminating Black Consciousness ideology had a 
powerful impact in Soweto schools in the-early 1970s. They were important in initiating, 
politicizing and popularizing school debating and public speaking societies. They had the 
effect of widening intellectual horizons and raising confidence and aspirations. Their highly 
intellectual approach was, however, almost entirely inaccessable to non-school youths. 
Conflict and Solidarity 
A Soweto male teenager could think of himself all at  once as, say, a Green Beret, an 
Orlando High School student, a Sotho, a clever and a kalkoen. These were all possible 
identities which could be drawn on according to time and circumstance. SpecBc moments 
of conflict, threat and competition sharpened these identities. Gang, neighbourhood and 
school were crucial loci of potential protection and support. 
Although gangs within a neighbourhood competed locally, they also felt a neighbourhood 
solidarity. When threat arose from outside the neighbourhood local gangs would generally 
club together in support. In the 1960s and early 1970s. according to Thebo Mohapi, 
Orlando youths fought regularly with those from Meadowlands over access to a dam on the 
border of the two areas. Although there were internal tensions amongst Orlando gangs, the 
"kids from Meadowlands" were identified clearly as the rivals. Catties and stones were used 
in these heated fights. Ndofaya and kalkoen identities were activated here to reinforce 
neighbourhood unity. Meadowlands was heavily occupied by ex-Western Areas residents. 
"They would call us kalkoen and we would call them ndofayaW.71 Similarly, neighbourhood 
and, in this case, ethnic solidarity was evoked in the border wars between Zola and Naledi 
youth. There were routine stone-throwing fights across the dividing road in the 1960s.72 
Khotso Seathlolo provides another, perhaps less aggressive, example of neighbourhood 
unity in Naledi. He recalls that local non-school youth would come to Naledi High School 
soccer matches and root for the local team even though they were themselves pushouts. 
They felt "a certain loyalty" to the high schml In their area.73 
Gangs felt a protectiveness towards their own neighbourhoods. Residents, unless they were 
themselves members of rival street gangs, rarely felt threatened by a local gang. There was 
protection in familiarity. It was almost unheard of for a gangster to mug a person he knew. 
If a gangster killed or mugged a local he would be socially ostracized from that community. 
Danger lay precisely in anonymity; "outsiders" were victimized.74 The Dirty Dozen, for 
instance, were not feared by Moroka residents.75 Similarly, the Hazels "never troubled" the 
residents of Mzimhlophe.76 They robbed and mugged on trains or in areas where they were 
not known as individuals. A similar observation can be made, more cautiously, with sexual 
harassment. The relationship between gangster and moll was itself infused with 
compulsion but local women were nevertheless provided with a certain protection from 
outside harassment.77 The victims of gang rape were invariably outsiders.78 
Territoriality was at the root of intense gang conflict. Masculine status and prestige were 
inextricably linked to territory. It was essential to gang honour to hold your ground. To 
achieve "name and fame" a gang had to expand its territorial influence.79 Prestige and 
status aside, territoriality involved competition over women and material resources such as 
parks, halls and shebeens. Disputes over women were probably the single most important 
cause of friction. Gangs regarded women as territory-bound. An outsider courting a local 
woman represented the most serious breach of gang territorial codes. It would immediately 
trigger intense gang identification and conflict.80 But women were only one focus of 
competition. A Phiri resident, "Johannes", accounts for local gang wars in the early 1970s 
as follows. "It's true sometimes girls were a problem. Mosty we fought for scarce... facilities, 
things like community halls and parks.. . Parks were created between two territories and the 
children of both territories could fight for the sole ownership of that park. The war between 
the Sleep Out Gang and the 2x5 was fought [over a] park ..." Spokes Ndlovu also recalls 
that the Sleep Out Gang clashed with the Movers of neighbouring Mapetla during a concert 
at the local community hall; they were competingfor "ownership" of the hall.81 The large 
criminal gangs often clashed when they attempted to establish exclusive access to areas of 
criminal operation. Bra Foca explains the Hazel's war with the Dirty Dozen largely in these 
terms. "We fought with the Dirty Dozen in town for a place of operation and domination 
plus the name and farne."82 Revenge and counter-revenge nourished gang conflict. Gangs 
would organize reprisals in response to attacks on their own members, or even attacks on 
members of the neighbourhood to which they felt a loyalty. This would set in motion a 
cycle of violence which heightened gang identification.83 
As I have pointed out, neighbourhood association obscured divisions between local school 
and non-school youth. Nevertheless, throughout the 1960s and early 70s tension 
mounted between schools and gangs. School-goers were subjected to constant harassment 
and robbery from gangs, generally coming from outside neighbourhoods. This often led to 
outbursts of violent conflict. Pushout gangsters felt a contradictory mix of resentment and 
scorn towards schoolchildren. They felt resentment because they had been excluded from 
the education system; they adhered to the scornful anti-education, anti-work ethic of the 
gang culture, which, it could be argued, was reinforced by that very exclusion.84 School- 
goers were also ideal targets for gangsters. Female students, who were generally strictly 
controlled domestically and rarely ventured out unescorted after dark, were vulnerable and 
exposed on their way to and from school. These moments provided gangsters with 
opportunities for sexual harassment, abduction and rape.85 Pocket money could also be 
robbed and extorted with relative ease.86 Gang harassment seemed to get steadily worse 
during the 1960s and peaked during the period of secondary school expansion in the 1970s. 
Two Sowetan headmasters observed in 1972 that students were staying away from certain 
schools for fear of gang harassment.87 By 1973 it was reported that several schoolchildren 
died at the hands of gangsters annually. Moreover, "the toll of brutally assaulted pupils" 
was "on the increase."88 It is possible that the expansion of secondary schooling itself was 
the source of rising tension. Unlike the highly localized primary schools, high schools drew 
in students from a much wider geographical spread. This had distinct territorial 
implications. High school membership cut across neighbourhoods, competing with, and 
threatening, intensely localized identities. Conflict and threat, in turn, activated powerful 
school identifications. School identity emerged sharply out of the tangle of school, street 
and neighbourhood loyalties when fellow schoolmembers were subjected to assault or 
harassment. 
School students responded to harassment with united anti-gang operations. Morris 
Isaacson and Orlando High School had long traditions of effective resistance. Headmasters 
and teachers at these two schools cooperated actively with the students. By the late 1960s 
they had become no-go zones for the gangs. As early as 1959 Morris Isaacson conducted a 
successful "war" against the Apaches.89 Fanyana Mazibuko recalls that when he joined 
Morris Isaacson in 1966 there was a "spirit of unity and mutual support at the school". By 
the late 1960s every tsotsi in the White City-Jabavu area knew that "he had to leave town" 
if he meddled with students from Morris Isaacson. He and a few other teachers were given 
the responsibility of stamping out Dirty Dozen activity in the area. The gang had been 
terrorizing and harassing students on their way to school and back. Things came to a head 
when a student was stabbed while trying to rescue some Morris girls from molestation. A 
group of students went out and fetched the gangster responsible. The gangster was 
"roughed up" and then handed over to the police, who promptly released him. Shortly 
thereafter another Morris student was stabbed in revenge. Mazibuko asked the headmaster 
for a day off school to clean up the gang properly. He went out with a huge force of 
students and systematically rounded up 70 Dirty Dozens. They were easy to identify 
because they had a distinctive tattoo on their arms. They were an enormous gang "so it 
was only when they realised that there were 800 boys out looking for them that they knew 
they were tangling with big trouble". Many of the gangsters were charged and jailed but, 
more importantly, the schoolboys gave them a stern warning.90 Mary Mxadana, who 
taught at "Morris" between 1968 and 1976 was also impressed by the unity with which 
students disciplined criminal elements. "If you wore a school uniform you were really 
protected." Tsotsis never entered school property.91 In February 1976, Morris Isaacson 
students made headlines when they beat up a "youth" who had allegedly been molesting 
students. They resisted attempts by the police to intervene and proceed with official 
charges, claiming that the police were ineffective and that they had their "own courts" to 
deal with the youth.92 Orlando High had a similar history with gangs. In the early 1960s 
the school suffered harassment from the Apaches, Berlins and, most persistently, the Black 
Swines. After a "serious incident", Kambule, the headmaster, called out every male student 
from class and told them that a group of Black Swines from Jabavu was causing trouble. 
He ordered the students to "bring every one of those boys" to his office. "It was the most 
dramatic day the school had ever had." The Black Swines were dragged to Kambule's office 
where he personally sjambokked them severely. From then on anyone who interfered with 
an Orlando High School student had to "answer to the whole school". "Here at Orlando 
High," Kambule used to say, "we are one gang."Q3 Curtis Nkondo, who taught at Orlando 
High School in the 1960s, makes the same point. When schoolgirls were molested or 
abducted "that resulted in the schoolboys becoming very angry and going into the location 
hunting for these tsotsis."94 Naledi High School and Sekano Ntoana developed a similar 
reputation in the 1970s. At Naledi the students had a real sense of "self-identity' and 
"solidarity". If any student suffered at  the hands of gangsters the student body would 
organize self-defence units to punish the culprits.95 At Sekano Ntoana, Jake Msimanga 
recalls, the gangsters "really lacked the guts just to pounce on you. There would be no 
school for two or three days until they were apprehended. So they knew what it meant." 
Msimanga goes on to observe that this was a common experience in the townships. "From 
very early on in my township experience people had no faith in the police. People would go 
out, bring them back into the schoolyard and thrash these guys."Q6 
School responses, which tended to be extremely angry and often brutal, reflected an intense 
student self-identification. Johannes Radebe describes the reprisal of his school, Mncube 
High, against the persistently troublesome Top Five gang in 1969. There was striking unity 
and eagerness on the part of students when the headmaster gave the go-ahead for action. 
"When the principal said they must go and discipline the gang, a wide variety of weapons 
was raised up and students said 'Yes Sir' with their weapons pointing up. They had waited 
for that time ... We left singing, both boys and girls hunting the gang members." Radebe 
himself had a big axe with him that day which he named "Love and Peace". Nineteen gang 
members were rounded up. "At school every student was forced to whip a gang member 
once on his buttocks. Imagine, we were more than 600 students and this means that each 
gang member was given more than 600 whips by students. From then on the gang 
disintegrated and they started respecting students."Q7 
Gangsters were killed and assaulted in a number of school offensives during the 1970s. In 
August 1972 sixteen Pimville school students appeared in court following the death of an 
X5 gang member in a school reprisal. The students offered in their defence that the 
Kliptown police failed to act against the gang which had been making life "unbearable" in 
Pimville.98 In April 1974 a Zola youth, who had apparently been involved in ongoing gang 
harassment, was stoned to death by a group of students from Jabulani Junior Secondary 
School.99 The best publicized incident occurred in November 1974 when students from the 
Phiri Higher Primary School clashed with the 2x5 gang. Two gangsters were killed and five 
injured. Two teachers and seven students were later committed for trial. The accused were 
"said to have cornered. them in a house after an intensive search." The trialists were 
eventually given suspended sentences after the headmaster of Phiri Higher Primary led 
evidence in mitigation, much as in the Pimville X5 case, that students had been subjected 
to ongoing harassment and were frustrated by the failure of the police to act effectively.lo0 
Two informants who witnessed the Phiri reprisal emphasize the brutality of the students. It 
was rumoured that when the brother of the 2x5 leader was killed: "his intestines were taken 
out of his stomach". 101 Spokes Ndlovu, an ex-member of the gang, recalls that students 
were in the process of hacking the leader's leg with a hacksaw when the police 
intervened.102 In another well publicized case in May 1976 two "thugs", who were 
molesting a school teacher on her way to work, were beaten to death by students in 
Orlando North. "The children stormed out of the school and attacked the men when they 
heard [the teacher] screaming for help. The two would-be robbers fled when they saw the 
hundreds of children pouring out of Orlando North Secondary School. But one of them 
was caught and stoned near the school. The other was beaten to death by a group of 
children who chased him more than a mile through the streets before cornering him in a 
yard ... An onlooker said later that he had never imagined that schoolchildren could be so 
vicious." 103 
Conclusion 
In accounts of the Soweto uprising, historians have tended to take a united identity for 
granted amongst the African youth. Clearly a black consciousness, reinforced by pass 
controls and other apartheid laws, was latent and potentially powerful throughout the 
1960s and 1970s. But the process whereby this consciousness became a positive identity 
which united the youth needs to be plotted carefully. Throughout this period youth 
identities were fractured into extremely parochial entities of neighbourhood, school and 
gang. Horizons were defined by a radius of walking distance. The Black Consciousness 
Movement had to work hard to forge a wider racial consciousness and unity. The 
expansion of schooling from around 1972, made this process possible in Soweto.104 
Schooling had the effect of creating wider youth collectivities. It provided a context in 
which to build an identity beyond the very parochial. It must also be emphasized that the 
movement towards youth unity was partial even during the uprising itself. Although the 
National Youth Organization (NAY01 was formed primarily to reach youth beyond the 
schools, Black Consciousness activists made very little real progress in "conscientizing" and 
mobilizing youth gang elements. Although gangs often took it upon themselves to enforce 
boycotts and stay-aways, their activities were sporadic and uncoordinated and their violent 
methods contradicted Soweto Students' Representative Council (SSRC) policy. Gangs also 
collapsed definitions between political activity and ordinary criminality. The SSRC 
eventually formed "squads" to discipline and monitor youth gangs and protect residents 
fiom harassment.105 Clearly, many non-school Soweto youths did identify themselves as 
part of a wider black resistance movement at certain moments during 1976-7. But powerful 
parochial identities and antagonisms continued to overlap and intersect with broader 
notions of identification. An identity can never be assumed: it is a latent resource which 
can be triggered historically or actively welded through ideology. 
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